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Chronology
303 BCE: Founding of Dura-Europos by Seleucus I Nicator
113 BCE: Conquest of Dura-Europos by Parthians
64 BCE: Incorporation of the province of Roman Syria into the Roman Empire
256 CE: Conquest of Dura-Europos by Sassanid king Shapur I
1914–1918: World War I
March 1920: Proclamation of Faisal as king of Syria
March 1920: Discovery of wall paintings at Dura-Europos by British soldiers from India
April 1920: San Remo conference creating British and French mandates in the Middle East
July 1920: Ouster of King Faisal by the French military
1922–1923: French excavation at Dura-Europos under Franz Cumont
1923: Ratification of the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon
1925–1927: Great Syrian Revolt
1928: Founding of the National Bloc
1928: Start of American excavation at Dura-Europos under Michael Rostovtzeff
1929: Start of French excavation at Ugarit under Claude Schaeffer
1929: Start of French excavation at Palmyra under Henri Seyrig
1929: Resumption of German excavation at Tell Halaf under Max von Oppenheim
1931: Start of Danish excavation at Hama under Harald Ingholt
1931: Appointment of Clark Hopkins as field director at Dura-Europos
1932: Founding of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party
1933: Founding of the League of National Action
1933: Start of French excavation at Mari by Louvre team
1937: Start of British excavation at Tell Atshana under Leonard Woolley
1939–1945: World War II
1945: De jure Syrian independence
1946: Evacuation of last French troops from Syria

Bussemaker 2

Introduction
“Let me take you for a moment to the Syrian desert, and the right bank of the Middle
Euphrates.”1 At a half-dozen lectures during the 1930s spanning two continents, several
countries, and multiple languages, Yale classics professor Michael Rostovtzeff would commence
his talk with some variation of this same sentence.2 He would proceed to describe the Yale-led
excavation of the ancient Syrian city of Dura-Europos, inviting the listener to delve into a world
of miraculous finds, hauntingly beautiful desert landscapes, and ruins illuminating the arc of both
Western and Eastern civilization.
Rostovtzeff undertook his speaking tour at a time when archaeology in the Middle East
was undergoing a revival. Under the auspices of French and British authorities in modern-day
Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq, Western archaeologists poured into the region
during the 1920s and 1930s.3 In explaining the popularity of Middle Eastern archaeology at the
time, Jotham Johnson — a Yale graduate student working at the Dura-Europos site — declared,
“The Outer World [of non-archaeologists] believes that archaeology is a profession of romance,
of stately caravans in far-off lands, of exciting discoveries, of leisurely study. The Outer World is
not far wrong.”4

1

Notes for “Dura-Europos on the Euphrates,” Box 30, Folder 186, Michael Ivanovich Rostovtzeff Papers (MS
1133), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.
2
Michael Rostovtzeff (1870–1952) was a Russian-born ancient historian who served as the Sterling Professor of
Ancient History and Archaeology at Yale University from 1925 until his retirement in 1944. He served as President
of the American Historical Association in 1935 and is best known for his 1926 magnum opus, The Social and
Economic History of the Hellenistic World. For more information on Rostovtzeff’s life and career, see Joseph G.
Manning, ed., Writing History in Times of War: Michael Rostovtzeff, Elias Bickerman and the “Hellenization of
Asia” (Stuttgart, Germany: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2015),
https://elibrary.steiner-verlag.de/book/99.105010/9783515109536.
3
Salam Al Quntar, “Repatriation and the Legacy of Colonialism in the Middle East,” Journal of Eastern
Mediterranean Archaeology & Heritage Studies 5, no. 1 (2017): 19. Accessed March 14, 2021.
doi:10.5325/jeasmedarcherstu.5.1.0019.
4
Jotham Johnson, “‘A Trade for Halliburton.’ Archaeology the Adventurous, as Viewed by One Whose Present
Address Is “Fouilles de Doura-Europos, Salihiyeh Euphrate, Syria,”” Princeton Alumni Weekly 29, 1929, 741.
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In reality, the world of Syrian archaeology during the French mandate was less romantic
and more political than either Rostovtzeff or Johnson expressed. Although both men filled their
writing with many of the orientalist tropes that pervaded Western art and academia at the time,
recent postcolonial literature has moved away from cultural explanations for this spike in interest
and instead has expanded exploration of the relationship between archaeology and imperialism.5
Contemporary archaeologists posited their work as purely academic, but their projects were
closely aligned with the British and French mandate regimes controlling the Levant at the time.
Not only did archaeologists work under mandate governments, but they actively used their work
“to construct the non-West, to forge a cultural lineage to the West, and to separate opposing
identities.”6 Modern scholars have therefore termed archaeology the “stepchild of imperialism”
— not just associated but inextricably tied to the political goals of French and British colonial
powers.7
The use of archaeology for political purposes has been well documented in neighboring
British mandates such as Palestine and Iraq and even in post-independence Syrian history.8 But
the politics of archaeology under the French mandate for Syria and the Lebanon — especially the
attitudes of Syrians themselves — has only recently begun to receive the same scrutiny. This
paper aims to highlight the diversity of perspectives of all those involved in Syrian archaeology

5

Edward Said encapsulates orientalism in the introduction to his seminal 1978 work, Orientalism, in which he
states, “The Orient was almost a European invention, and had been since antiquity a place of romance, exotic beings,
haunting memories and landscapes, remarkable experiences.” Edward W. Said, Orientalism, First Vintage books
edition (New York: Vintage, 1979), 1.
6
Laurence Gillot, “Towards a Socio-Political History of Archaeology in the Middle East: The Development of
Archaeological Practice and Its Impacts on Local Communities in Syria,” Bulletin of the History of Archaeology, 20
(2010): 4, DOI: http://doi.org/10.5334/bha.20102.
7
Zainab Baharani, “Conjuring Mesopotamia: Imaginative Geography and a World Past” in Archaeology Under
Fire: Nationalism, Politics and Heritage in the Eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, ed. Lynn Meskell (London,
New York: Routledge, 1998), 159–174; Donald Malcolm Reid, Whose Pharaohs?: Archaeology, Museums, and
Egyptian National Identity from Napoleon to World War I (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 2.
8
For an in-depth examination of the creation of a Syrian national identity after independence, see Stéphane Valter,
La construction nationale syrienne: légitimation de la nature communautaire du pouvoir par le discours historique,
(Paris: CNRS Editions, 2002).
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and discourse surrounding Syria’s ancient history during the French mandate, from French
political and cultural authorities and Western archaeologists who came to Syria to excavate, to
local laborers at excavations and the indigenous populations these excavations displaced, to
Syrian and Arab nationalists debating Syria’s past and future and insurgent leaders who used
historical rhetoric to rebel against the mandatory regime.
During the time of the French mandate in Syria in the 1920s and 1930s, both French
government officials and Syrian nationalists fought to establish competing claims of political
legitimacy by using the country’s archaeological sites and ancient history. French government
officials — and the Western archaeologists they worked with — used archaeological sites to
control space and to give a justification for the mission civilisatrice to French and other foreign
audiences.9 This approach alienated many Syrian audiences in the early years of the mandate,
leading to the occasional destruction of ancient artifacts. In the mandate’s second decade, Syrian
nationalists began to insist on local sovereignty over archaeology, thereby using ancient history
as a way to bring together Syrians across social divides and to legitimize their struggle for a
political unit encompassing all of Greater Syria. But they were often undermined by the
opposing rhetoric of Arab nationalists and the rigidity of French institutions, and so Syrian
nationalists ended up unable to assert indigenous control over archaeology to the same extent as
in neighboring countries like Iraq, which had greater local sovereignty and a more coherent
nationalist ideology.

9

The mission civilisatrice, or “civilizing mission,” was the ideology underpinning much of French and other
European imperial expansion at the time. Matthew Burrows, “‘Mission Civilisatrice’: French Cultural Policy in the
Middle East, 1860-1914,” The Historical Journal 29, no. 1 (1986): 109-35, accessed April 9, 2021,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2639258.
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Chronology
Many empires have laid claim to the land that is now Syria. Over the course of the second
and third millennia BCE, various parts of Syria came under the control of a series of Semitic and
Mesopotamian civilizations, including the Sumerians, Eblaites, Akkadians, Hitties, and
Babylonians.10 In the first millennium BCE, the Canaanite and Phoenician civilizations occupied
the Syrian coast, while the Arameans and Assyrians dominated the interior. Syria then fell under
the sway of successive Persian and Hellenistic empires, including the Achaemenids, Seleucids,
and Parthians. After Pompey the Great’s conquest of Antioch in 64 BCE, Syria became a Roman
province, although the Romans endured both domestic resistance from local leaders like Zenobia
of Palmyra and foreign challenges from the Sassanian Empire until the fall of the Western
Roman Empire in 476, which brought an end to what most scholars deem “ancient history.”11
This diversity of peoples and cultures is visible in the ruins of ancient Syrian cities like
Dura-Europos and Palmyra, where archaeologists have stumbled upon artifacts and structures
melding the artistic and architectural styles of distinct civilizations. Dura-Europos, for example,
was founded at the end of the fourth century BCE by the Greek Seleucus I Nicator, a general of
Alexander the Great. The city came under the control of Parthians from modern-day Iran in 113
BCE, and Parthians held the city until Syria came under Roman rule in 64 BCE. After a long
siege, Dura-Europos fell in 256 CE to the Sassanid king Shapur I, who deported its surviving
population and abandoned the city itself. Even the name Dura-Europos — a modern amalgam —
brings together the names of the site from these different cultures.12
10

Cyril John Gadd and William L. Ochsenwald, “History,” Encyclopedia Britannica, accessed April 9, 2021,
https://www.britannica.com/place/Syria/Media-and-publishing#ref29902.
11
For more detail on Zenobia’s life and her role in the Western imagination, see Rex Winsbury, Zenobia of Palmyra:
History, Myth and the Neo-Classical Imagination (London: Duckworth, 2010).
12
“Europos” was the original Greek name of the colony, while “Dura” comes from the Assyrian word for “fortress.”
The debate about when and under whom the city had which name is ongoing. Jennifer Baird, Dura-Europos
(London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2018), 7, 19.
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After the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, Syria was a cornerstone of the
Byzantine Empire until its conquest by Muslim Arabs in the seventh century. During four
centuries of Ottoman rule starting in 1516, Syria was divided into several wilayets, or provinces,
ruled from Istanbul and usually with limited local autonomy.13 After the collapse of the Ottoman
empire at the end of the First World War, the Hashemite King Faisal briefly ruled Syria. The
French military ousted him in the summer of 1920, after the victorious Allies delegated authority
over the Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon to France at the San Remo Conference.14
The imposition of the French mandate was met with hostility from much of the Syrian
population. From 1925 to 1927, the Great Syrian Revolt brought together Sunni, Druze, Alawite,
Christian, and Shia groups across economic classes and regional boundaries against the French
mandate in a mass insurrection eventually put down brutally by French forces. Around the same
time, nationalist political parties began to form, including the National Bloc in 1928, the Syrian
Social Nationalist Party in 1932, and the League of National Action in 1933. 15

13

Onn Winckler, Joseph Ginat, and Moshe Maʻoz, Modern Syria: From Ottoman Rule to Pivotal Role in the Middle
East (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), 1.
14
Differing from colonies, mandates were created by the League of Nations and were meant to be a temporary form
of administration. According to Matz, “two elements formed the core of the Mandate System: the principle of
non-annexation of the territory on the one hand and its administration as a ‘sacred trust of civilisation’ on the other.
While these considerations addressed some problems, e.g. the general restriction of the powers of the Mandatories,
they raised others, particularly with regard to who had sovereignty over the territory.” For more on the mandate
system, see Nele Matz, “Civilization and the Mandate System under the League of Nations as Origin of
Trusteeship,” Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law Online 9, 1 (2005): 47-95, doi:
https://doi.org/10.1163/187574105X00039.
15
Adeed Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2016), 79; Adel Beshara (ed.), Antun Sa'adeh: The Man, His Thought: an Anthology (Reading:
Garnet Publishing, 1999), 2; David Kenneth Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism in the Middle East 1914-1958
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 277.
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Figure 1: Map of the French Mandate for Syria and the Lebanon. The mandate was divided into
several territories, each with a regional government, although the entire mandate fell under the
purview of the French High Commissioner of the Levant and institutions like Service des
Antiquités. The main excavations discussed in this paper are shown. Map created by Laura
Bussemaker.

During the time of the French mandate, several major excavations took place. This paper
will focus on the excavation of the city of Dura-Europos, which the French government started in
1922 with Belgian archaeologist Franz Cumont at the helm. After the Great Syrian Revolt, the
French gave permission for a Yale-led excavation at the same site under Rostovtzeff’s
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leadership.16 Among the other digs that took place, the best known was the excavation of the
ancient Semitic city of Palmyra, which began in 1929 under the supervision of Henri Seyrig.17
Excavation of the Canaanite port city of Ugarit began in 1929 under French archaeologist Claude
Schaeffer, and a team of archaeologists from the Louvre excavated the Sumerian site of Mari
near the Iraqi border starting in 1933.18 The French mandate government also actively
encouraged foreign excavations compared to its neighbors.19 There were thirteen foreign-led digs
in Syria by 1936, including excavations at Tell Halaf by German scholar Max von Oppenheim in
the northeast, Tell Atshana in the northwest by the British Leonard Woolley, and Hama in the
east by the Danish Harald Ingholt between 1931 and 1939.20
“European Islands Lost in an Asiatic Ocean”: French Political Uses of Archaeology
From the beginning, French political authorities knew that establishing their political
legitimacy and authority over the country would be difficult. As in other French colonies, the
mandatory regime relied mainly on two strategies: the cooptation of local elites and a strategy of
“divide and rule” that attempted to weaken the nationalist movement by separating the nation’s
diverse regions.21 These strategies alone proved insufficient. At the end of the Great Syrian
Revolt, French High Commissioner Henri Ponsot wrote back to Paris that “we must seize this
occasion and choose: either we continue to practice a policy based above all on our military
force, or we make a definite attempt to come to terms with the nationalist opposition and let it

16

Yale University Art Gallery, “Dura-Europos: Excavating Antiquity,” accessed April 9, 2021,
http://media.artgallery.yale.edu/duraeuropos/dura.html.
17
Seyrig also led the excavation of Seleucid-founded Emesa, or modern-day Homs in western Syria. Michel
Al-Maqdissi, (ed.), Pionniers et protagonistes de l’archéologie syrienne, 1860–1960. D’Ernest Renan à Sélim
Abdulhak (Ministère de la Culture, D.G.A.M., Damas: Documents d’Archéologie Syrienne XIV), 142.
18
Al-Maqdissi, Pionniers et protagonistes de l’archéologie syrienne, 191.
19
James F. Goode, Negotiating for the Past: Archaeology, Nationalism, and Diplomacy in the Middle East,
1919-1941 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 220.
20
Al-Maqdissi, Pionniers et protagonistes de l’archéologie syrienne, 59, 96, 153.
21
Winckler, Ginat, and Maʻoz, Modern Syria, 2.
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eventually come to power.”22 Recognizing this weakness and perceived illegitimacy of the
mandatory government, the French used every tool at their disposal to warrant their presence in
Syria to both the local population and the French public back home — including archaeology.
This strategy of legitimization built upon the infrastructure that the French state
developed in its colonization of Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia, which relied upon institutions
like the Service des Antiquités, Beaux-Arts, et Monuments Historiques to excavate Roman ruins
and reconstruct North African cities to mirror French urbanism.23 A wave of antiquity-related
institutions came into being during the mandate, such as the Institut d’Art et d’Archéologie
Islamique (Institute of Islamic Art and Archaeology) in 1918, the Service des Antiquités
(Department of Antiquities) and the Mission Archéologique Permanente (Standing
Archaeological Commission) in 1919, and the Institut Français des Études Arabes de Damas
(French Institute of Arabic Studies of Damascus) in 1930.24
With this wide array of organizations, the government managed for more than a decade to
keep a tight grip on all archaeological work that took place on Syrian soil and thereby control the
narrative that emerged from such excavation. In doing so, the French employed the practice of
archaeology in several ways: controlling physical space, asserting military dominance, answering
for the cost of the mandatory project by sending valuable artifacts to the metropole, and
justifying the French civilizing mission by presenting the history of European civilization and
Christianity in Syria. This politicization of archaeology relied upon both French-led digs and
excavations led by foreigners like the Yale team at Dura-Europos, who contributed to French

22

Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 264.
Gwendolyn Wright, “Tradition in the Service of Modernity: Architecture and Urbanism in French Colonial Policy,
1900-1930,” The Journal of Modern History 59, no. 2 (1987): 300, accessed April 10, 2021,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/1879728.
24
Gillot, “Towards a Socio-Political History of Archaeology in the Middle East,” 5.
23
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political endeavors in exchange for permission to excavate and export antiquities and for French
help with the logistics and security of archaeological sites.

Archaeology as Physical Control
Although the field of archaeology feels like it belongs more to the world of museums and
universities than to the realm of politics and warfare, archaeological digs nevertheless served a
key strategic purpose for the French government. Lacking the classic “consent of the governed,”
the French administration in Syria faced fierce opposition to its presence and therefore relied
heavily upon the military and use of brute force.25 Due to both the limited power of the
war-weary army and the nature of Syria’s geography, the French opted for a strategy termed la
guerre colonial, which was based on controlling movement through space rather than the space
itself.26
One of the greatest obstacles to French control over both territory and movement was the
desert. This obstacle manifested itself both topographically and culturally. At the most basic
level, the unwelcoming vastness and emptiness of the desert did not lend themselves to total
dominance. In addition, the desert’s Bedouin inhabitants followed a lifestyle far removed from
norms the French tried to impose, leading nomadic tribes to play a decisive role in insurgent
movements like the 1925 Great Syrian Revolt.27 In describing the French frustration with desert
landscapes, Neep argues, “Desert distances are too vast, the territory too inhospitable and the
logistics too unworkable for the colonial state to unfurl its institutional arms and embrace
Bedouin society, much less to reach inside and reorder it.”28 The impenetrability of the Syrian
25

Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 261.
Daniel Neep, Occupying Syria under the French Mandate: Insurgency, Space and State Formation (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), 103, doi:10.1017/CBO9780511686856.
27
Philip S. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate: the Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920-1945 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1989), 169, https://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.00266.
28
Neep, Occupying Syria under the French Mandate, 165.
26
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desert comes through in one of Rostovtzeff’s letters to Yale University President James Angell,
in which he explained that the dig’s French-born field director, Maurice Pillet, faced “various
difficulties which he had had to surmount in shipping his material from Aleppo to the distant
ruins of Dura.”29 With such hurdles to exerting control, the French desperately needed footholds
in the desert.
Sites like Dura-Europos, in spite of their image as ancient cities far removed from
contemporary conflicts, were embedded in the strategic landscape of Syria. In fact, Europeans
first identified Dura-Europos’ treasures during a battle in 1920, when British troops used the
stone walls surrounding the city as a line of defense against Ottoman troops until the Ottomans
forced them to retreat and abandon the city.30 The site again became a site of violence in 1925,
when the Great Syrian Revolt put a halt to excavations.31
Given this ongoing conflict, dig sites doubled as government and military outposts,
serving as oases of French control in an otherwise unyielding landscape. At sites like
Dura-Europos, Palmyra, Mari, and Ugarit, French officials led or supervised the excavations,
citing the “hazardous” nature of such enterprises and the “political instability of the region.”32
When it came to France’s political rivals on the international stage, the government was
sometimes loath to yield control over excavations to foreigners. Although the German Max von
Oppenheim had excavated parts of Tell Halaf in northeastern Syria before the First World War,
the mandate government did not grant his team permission to resume their dig until 1927, after
Germany joined the League of Nations.33
29

Letter from Michael Rostovtzeff to James Angell, April 27, 1928, Box 1, Folder 6, George Lincoln Hendrickson
Papers (MS 1272), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.
30
“The Old and the New on the Euphrates,” Box 3, Folder 27, Hopkins Family Papers (MS 290), Manuscripts and
Archives, Yale University Library.
31
Baird, Dura-Europos, 6.
32
Gillot, “Towards a Socio-Political History of Archaeology in the Middle East,” 6.
33
France’s hesitance to allow Oppenheim (1860–1946) to return to Syria may not have been unfounded. To British
authorities in the years leading up to the First World War, he was known as “the Kaiser’s spy” and “the chief
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Even when foreign teams received permits to excavate, French forces still played a key
role. In 1928, for example, the French military assigned forty Syrian soldiers from the Syrian
Legion to Dura-Europos, as well as eighteen gendarmes or gardes mobiles.34 Another visible
vestige of the French military was Le Comte Robert du Mesnil du Buisson, a former captain in
the French army representing the French academy during the 1932 season of the dig at Dura,
who frequently paraded around the ruins in his military uniform.35 For local populations working
at or living near excavations, the presence of the French government — and above all the French
military — was inescapable.
Not only did the troops assigned to such digs assist with the security of the camps, but
they sometimes played a vital role in the excavation work itself. Rostovtzeff reported to Yale
President Angell in 1928 that civil and military authorities in Abou Kamal and Sahliyeh helped
Pillet get “a sufficient supply of native labor,” and the gendarmes assigned to the camp assisted
“Pillet in supervising the native workmen.”36 Under the supervision of the unit’s commander, the
military detachment freed the Gate of Palmyra “from a deep layer of sandstones and rubbish.”37
In his report to the director of Syria’s Antiquities Service, Pillet noted that forty soldiers were
involved in the excavation of the Gate of Palmyra, while only ten gardes mobiles “assured the
site’s security.”38 The French military was even of use to excavation work in the air.39 World War
I aviator Antoine Poidebard undertook numerous flights over the desert to contribute to the
instigator and organizer of a projected Muslim jihad against the Entente powers (Britain, France, and Russia).”
Lionel Gossman, The Passion of Max von Oppenheim: Archaeology and Intrigue in the Middle East from Wilhelm II
to Hitler (Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers, 2013), xxv, 126.
34
The gendarmerie was (and still is) a branch of the French military responsible for internal security.
35
Baird, Dura-Europos, 12; Simon James, “Stratagems, Combat, and ‘Chemical Warfare’ in the Siege Mines of
Dura-Europos,” American Journal of Archaeology 115, no. 1 (2011): 70, doi:10.3764/aja.115.1.0069.
36
Letter from Michael Rostovtzeff to James Angell, April 27, 1928, Box 1, Folder 6, Hendrickson Papers.
37
Ibid.
38
Report from Maurice Pillet to Henri Seyrig, July 12, 1928, Box 1, Folder 6, Hendrickson Papers.
39
Stephen L. Dyson, In Pursuit of Ancient Pasts: A History of Classical Archaeology in the Nineteenth and
Twentieth Centuries (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), 174-175; Michael Sommer, Palmyra: A History
(New York: Routledge, 2018), 4.
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understanding of the eastern Roman frontier system, and Henri Seyrig, director of the Antiquities
Service for Lebanon and Syria, promised the Yale team the use of several Syrian air officers to
make aerial maps of the area.40
At Palmyra, the French military went a step further in making their mark on the site. The
1st Méhariste Company first established a base by the Temple of Bel in Palmyra in 1921 and
played an important role in pacifying the surrounding desert.41 Seyrig began excavations at the
site in 1929, and in doing so uprooted the local population. To give the archaeologists free rein,
French engineers from the Service du Génie began building a new settlement nearby to relocate
the Palmyrene Syrians, who numbered in the thousands.42 This new garrison town followed
French architectural principles, including wide, perpendicular avenues, a municipal building, and
streetlights. The Revue des Troupes du Levant even featured the settlement in 1936, reporting
that “native residents boast of Palmyra’s ‘avenues,’ filled with light and air, and of its
monuments and greenery!”43

40

Letter from Michael Rostovtzeff to James Angell, February 17, 1931, Box 94, Folder 955, James Rowland Angell,
President of Yale University, Records (RU 24), Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.
41
In fact, Palmyra was considered so strategically important that its control became a point of contention between
the French and British governments during the negotiation of the Sykes-Picot agreement. Arthur James Balfour,
Memorandum by Mr. Balfour (Paris) Respecting Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia [132187/2117/44A], vol. 4,
London: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 1919.
42
Neep, Occupying Syria under the French Mandate, 143.
43
Ibid, 142.
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Figure 2: Old village of Tadmor built on and among the ruins of Palmyra. All the contemporary
dwellings were demolished to make way for the French excavation under Henri Seyrig. Palmyra
(Tadmor). Street of village in Temple of the Sun, ca. 1920. Wikimedia Commons, accessed April
10, 2021, https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:01_tadmor_old_village.jpg.
The principle behind such building projects was that “adopting the spatial formations of
Western cities” could “gradually instil in the Levantine populations the disciplined habits of the
French modern.”44 As one French priest on the ground alleged, recruits living in the new houses
in Palmyra were more likely to spend time and money on their homes, rather than on playing
card games and loitering in the streets.45 With archaeological projects like that at Palmyra, the
French government found an opportunity to displace Syrians to settlements that the French
believed would push them toward European notions of modernity and civilization.
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Figure 3: Aerial map of ruins of Palmyra next to the modern French-designed city. Compared to
contemporary Syrian towns, the layout of the new town of Tadmor much more closely resembled
that of a French city. A map showing the ruins of ancient Palmyra, May 20, 2015. ABC News,
accessed April 10, 2021,
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2015-05-21/a-map-showing-the-ruins-of-ancient-palmyra/6486722
?nw=0.

The French government faced a dilemma during the mandate years: Should it use any
means necessary to pacify the Syrian desert and thereby risk its reputation at home and abroad,
or should it cede control over some of the mandate’s territory and fail in its self-proclaimed
mission civilisatrice? Archaeological sites helped provide a way out of this dichotomy. By
posting units nearby digs, the French military managed to exert more control over the local
population and impose French ways of living, while at the same time showing the world that
they were protecting archaeologists and promoting the pursuit of knowledge.
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Archaeology as Profit
Due in large part to this military presence, the Syrian project turned out to generate both
more costs and fewer revenues than anticipated. First and foremost, keeping the mandate afloat
required immense military expenditures. In 1921, there were 70,000 regular soldiers in the
Armée du Levant, as well as several Foreign Legion battalions, artillery batteries, and the
engineer and aviation corps.46 By 1936, France had spent around four billion francs on Syria
alone.47 The metropole received only meager economic returns on this enormous investment,
including incomes for “the Lyon silk firms, Marseille traders, army and navy officials, civil
servants, shareholders in the railways, and religious organizations.”48
Ancient ruins, however, proved a fruitful source of goods to send to France as a tangible
benefit of the occupation. The French public had long fostered a keen interest in antiquities from
the Middle East; museums only continued to grow in national importance into the twentieth
century, as competition to acquire ancient artifacts from Egypt and Mesopotamia swelled
between countries like France, England, Germany, and the United States.49 By leading
excavations abroad and importing antiquiting to showcase to the public at home, Western nations
asserted their authority on the world stage. For visitors to the British Museum and the Louvre,
seeing objects from faraway lands was therefore not just an amusing outing but a cause of
national pride.50
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To keep up with the European demand for ancient art, permission-granting agencies like
Seyrig’s Service des Antiquités contributed to a wave of antiquities leaving Syria, both for
France itself and other Western powers.51 Although earlier powers like the Ottomans had often
given foreign powers permission to export excavated goods, the French government kept a much
firmer hold over the antiquities trade.52 The High Commissioner issued an edict titled Arrêté no.
207 in 1926 regulating the trade, which banned the destruction of “mobile antiquities” and the
exportation of antiquities deemed belonging to the state. Those who destroyed ancient artifacts
faced a fine of 25 to 500 Syrian pounds, while those charged with illegal export faced much
more serious consequences: a fine of 50 to 100,000 Syrian pounds, as well as imprisonment of
eight days to six months.53 Given this disparity between punishments for destroying versus
illegally exporting antiquities, the French government did not just desire to protect artifacts, but
above all wanted to keep a preponderance of the pickings for themselves.
These French laws developed the partage system, under which the mandate government
and foreign-led excavation teams divided the findings of digs within Syrian borders.54 Under this
system, foreign archaeologists typically had to divide discovered artifacts into two approximately
equal piles, and a representative of the antiquities services would visit the site to decide which
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collection would remain in Syria and which could be exported.55 In theory, the system was
devised to ensure that half of all artifacts ended up in Syria’s newly founded museums, but both
French government officials and foreign archaeologists exploited the system to acquire a greater
share of the objects and to ensure that they could display the most impressive finds in Western
museums.
The controversies surrounding the partage system come through in correspondence
between Dura-Europos’ French field director, Maurice Pillet, and the Yale administration.
During the French-led excavations of Dura-Europos before the Great Syrian Revolt, the
government had shipped many of the discovered artifacts to the Louvre, where a significant
collection from the site remains to this day.56 Even when an American team came to lead the
excavation, the French government was determined to preserve the flow of antiquities to Paris. In
a draft of the contract between the French government and the Yale administration concerning
the excavations at Dura-Europos, the High Commissioner stated that “at the end of each
campaign, the mobile objects will be transported to Damascus and divided by the Special
Commission” established under Arrêté no. 207. The draft contract further noted that “unique
objects will enter the national collection of the Syrian state,” but that “the objects that demand
special study (parchment, tablets, etc.) will be transported to Paris and will not return to Syria
until publication is achieved.”57
These clauses angered Yale administrators, who felt cheated out of their share of the
spoils. In addition to seeking the prestige of conducting a major excavation in the Middle East,
Yale desperately wanted papyri and paintings for its collection, especially since the Yale
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University Art Gallery had just put the finishing touches on a new building. 58 Yale classics
professor Charles Torrey responded to Pillet asking, “Are we to understand that the ‘objects
which require special study ... are to be forwarded from Paris to New Haven? Unless this is the
case, I, for one, should not approve the acceptance of the conditions.”59 Pillet replied that goods
could be forwarded to New Haven as well, although Yale would have to acquire a permit for
temporary export out of Syria.60 The amended contract appeased the Yale administration, and by
1930, Hendrickson happily reported to President Angell that “a large number of valuable and
interesting objects discovered in the course of the excavations form a special exhibit in the Yale
Art Museum.”61 Although the contract was meant to ensure that unique objects returned to Syria
after they were studied and findings published, both the French government and foreign
institutions ignored this clause, and most of the items exported remained abroad.62
In spite of this brief respite, the conflict over the export of antiquities reemerged a few
years later. In 1932, Rostovtzeff penned a frustrated letter to President Angell about the dig’s
progress, reminding him that “ever since the beginning of our dig we wanted to have at least one
part of the frescoes discovered by [James Henry] Breasted and Cumont.”63 He explained that
Pillet negotiated an agreement with the Service des Antiquités in Syria for a fresco specialist to
come remove the artwork for transport to New Haven, which seemed at first “to be profitable to
us.” Then, however, he complained that “there is a bad clause which I would not have signed” if
58
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he had been in charge, revealing that the agreement stated that if any frescoes meant to go to the
French were to accidentally sustain damage in the delicate and pain-staking process of being
taken from the walls, the Director of Antiquities in Damascus would have the right to claim
those meant for Yale instead.
Although no damage occurred and Yale ended up with the fresco that it wanted, the
incident proved a breaking point in the relationship between Rostovtzeff and Pillet.64 Rostovtzeff
told Angell that “the only man who is to be blamed for” the difficulties with the excavation was
Pillet, leading him to conclude that “this story shows that Pillet must be eliminated from the dig
as soon as possible.”65 He urged the president to appoint Clark Hopkins as field director, which
was accomplished just a month later.66 But disagreements with the French continued under
Hopkins. In 1936, tensions between the French government and their American partners
escalated even further when the French instituted a new law more carefully regulating the export
of antiquities.67 Angell appealed to the U.S. Department of State, which in turn instructed the
American consul in Beirut to complain to the French High Commissioner.68 More so than any
other issue, the debate over the export of antiquities drove a wedge between the Yale
archaeologists and their French partners.
Yale was not the only institution to throw its weight — or even the support of its
government — behind its archaeologists. Leonard Woolley’s excavation at Tell Atshana received
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the encouragement and funding of the British Museum, Claude Schaeffer negotiated the division
of findings from Ugarit between the Louvre and the Alawite state, and Harald Ingholt’s dig at
Hamas laid the groundwork for the collection of the Antiquities Department in the National
Museum of Denmark.69 Such negotiations did not always go smoothly; Oppenheim struggled to
reach an agreement with the new authorities at Tell Halaf to export the antiquities he had
unearthed during his excavation at the site from 1911 to 1913.70 Again and again, debates over
the partage system proved a major source of discussion and sometimes contention between the
mandate government and foreign institutions, thus highlighting the importance of the right to
acquire artifacts as one of the key motivations for the French mandate, Western scholars, and
foreign governments.

Archaeology, Allochrony, and Colonial Legitimization
Beyond either of its physical uses, archaeology also allowed the French government to
harness ancient history to center the French civilizing spirit at the heart of its mandatory project.
The French government had known from the beginning that the Syrian mandate would not be
profitable, although perhaps they had misjudged just how unprofitable it would be. At the
expense of material gain, the French metropole was meant to receive the intangible benefits of
believing that they were bolstering the standing of France on the international stage, bringing
European civilization back to the Levant, and protecting the imperiled Christian communities
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there.71 To generate these abstract gains, Western archaeologists used their work to propagate two
contradictory arguments of colonial legitimization: that Syrians belonged to the past and were
therefore primitive and incapable of self-governance, and that Europeans had brought prosperity
and technological advancement to the region before and were returning to do so again.
On one hand, archaeology helped justify the paternalism inherent in the mission
civilisatrice. Writings and photographs from the excavations like that at Dura-Europos conflated
the ancient and contemporary inhabitants of the area, a phenomenon called allochrony.72 By
bringing attention to the similarities between past and present lifestyles, allochronic narratives
depicted contemporary Syrians as stuck in the past and therefore unable to embrace modernity
and change without Western aid.
Several Yale archaeologists at Dura-Europos contributed to such allochronic rhetoric,
both implicitly and explicitly. For example, Clark Hopkins — a Yale assistant classics professor
and the excavation’s second field director — highlighted the similarities between past and
present by describing the baking and building methods of the area’s Bedouin population, stating
that “today the same handmills found in the ruins of the ancient past serve to make the flour.”73
Comparing the excavated houses at Dura-Europos with contemporary Bedouin practices,
Hopkins also noted that “their houses were built, like those in a modern village, with a series of
little rooms grouped about a central court” and that some excavated houses featured a painted
“evil eye, pierced with nails and a sword, and attacked by cock, vulture, and scorpion, the same
symbol as is employed in the modern charm.”74 Turning from factual observation to criticism,
Hopkins argued that the site’s Arab workmen “live apart their primitive lives, looking a little
71
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contemptuously at modern politics, preferring the free, easy life of the desert.”75 With such
allochronic statements, Hopkins played into the French argument that Syrians were incapable of
self-governance.

Figure 4: A Bedouin woman using one of the handmills that Hopkins referenced in his
essay. Photograph accompanying “The Old and the New on the Euphrates.” Box 3, Folder 27.
Hopkins Family Papers (MS 290). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.

Such allochronic observations translated to the visual in the expedition’s extensive
photographic archives. Baird observes that many of the archaeologists’ images used members of
local Syrian communities to model textiles or show the scale of ancient buildings, and so the
photographs “place these people in the past and thereby depict them as living a life analogous to
those of the past and thus inferior to the contemporary world of the excavators.”76
75
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At the same time as Western archaeologists framed contemporary Syrians as belonging to
the past, they argued that this past belonged to Westerners instead. While Dura-Europos’
photographs portrayed Syrians as living in the past, they simultaneously “disinherite[d] them
from that past by depicting them as passive props or mere scales.”77 In this way, the Syrian
subjects of the photographs “stand in but do not inhabit the structures of Dura” shown.78

Figure 5: Workers resting by Gate of Palmyra at Dura-Europos. Like many other
photographs from the Dura-Europos archive, the Syrian workers sitting next to the ruins face
away from the camera and are portrayed as idle and distant. Photograph accompanying “The Old
and the New on the Euphrates.” Box 3, Folder 27. Hopkins Family Papers (MS 290).
Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.
Figure 6: Young boy living near the Dura-Europos site. Photographs from the
Dura-Europos archive depicting Syrians when they are not adjacent to ancient sites show them in
a completely different way. This boy is shown from up close and head on, showing a level of
emotion and personality that does not come across in photographs from the worksite itself.
Photograph accompanying “The Old and the New on the Euphrates.” Box 3, Folder 27. Hopkins
Family Papers (MS 290). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library.
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This lack of true interaction with the structures contrasts with one of the rare photos in
the collection of the Western archaeological team, in which Rostovtzeff and Cumont pose in the
Mithraeum — a temple of Mithras — with both their hands touching the altar. While the Syrian
subjects were adjacent to but not part of the buildings, the Western archaeologists could touch
and interact with the ruins.79 Through both writing and photography, Western archaeologists at
Dura-Europos used allochrony to objectify and patronize the local population and thereby defend
the existence of a mandatory government that was struggling to deny this same population
self-governance.

Figure 7: Michael Rostovtzeff (right) and Franz Cumont (left) posing by the Mithraeum.
The photographer's depiction of their interaction with the ruins differs immensely from the
depiction of the Syrian workers who did the excavation work. Raining Stones, accessed April 10,
2021,
https://manelmiro.com/2012/08/14/la-decadencia-de-la-ciudad-antigua-3-michael-i-rostovtzeff/.
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At the same time as they attempted to create distance between Syria’s ancient history and
its contemporary population, the Western archaeologists and imperial authorities presented
themselves as true heirs to the original inhabitants of the region. This trope began with James
Breasted, who first explored the ruins at Dura-Europos after their discovery by British forces and
coined the term “Fertile Crescent” to describe the Levant’s status as the cradle of civilization.80
In his telling of history, Western civilization first emerged in Mesopotamia, which then passed on
the torch to Greece, Rome, and eventually to Western European nations like Britain and France.81
This narrative developed during excavations at Dura-Europos under Franz Cumont, who wrote in
1926 that Hellenistic and Roman cities like Dura-Europos and Palmyra were “European islands
lost in an Asiatic ocean” that “had to struggle to protect themselves against the danger of being
submerged by the flood of aliens who surrounded them.”82
The notion that ancient sites like Dura-Europos were the heritage of the West and not of
Syria’s Arab population also underlaid Rostovtzeff’s rhetoric in the 1930s. As an expert on
Roman history, Rostovtzeff viewed the history of Dura-Europos through the lens of Rome’s
presence in the Levant, rather than through a lens that treated all the civilizations that inhabited
the region equally. In several speeches at universities across the United States, for example,
Rostovtzeff laid out a history of Dura-Europos that framed its change over time as an epic battle
between East and West, or as he put it, “the eternal problem: Orient or Rome.”83 In another
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speech, he described Dura as “a bridge between East and West, connecting the age old [sic]
civilizations of the East with the Greek world.”84
In the battle between “Orient” and “Rome,” Rostovtzeff took a clear side. In a speech on
the “importance of Dura,” he described the site as “Syrian Pompeii,” thereby framing the city as
an inferior example of Roman civilization on its frontiers, rather than viewing it as having a
culture in its own right.85 Although both the Romans and Parthians took over the city at various
points, he characterized the site as fundamentally Roman. To do so, he otherized the city’s
Parthian inhabitants, referring to Dura’s Parthian era as an “occupation” and a “struggle.”86 The
graduate student Jotham Johnson made this dichotomy between “European” and “native” even
more explicit in his description of the site’s name, detailing how the city’s Hellenistic founder
Seleucus “called it Europos, and the inhabitants were Europeans; the natives—it seems they had
them, even in those days—called it simply Doura, the Castle.”87
In describing the European rediscovery of Dura-Europos during the First World War, Yale
archaeologists personified the ruins as choosing Westerners as their saviors. Rostovtzeff narrated
how the city “was conquered, destroyed and then abandoned by the Sassanian Persians. Since
that time it has been a ruin, a part of the desert, which engulfed and preserved it, awaiting its
excavator,” while Johnson recounted how the Sassanids “abandoned it to goats and hyenas,”
allowing the desert to hide the shrines and paintings of the site “from the nomads of the plains”
until “the sand, self-willed, chose that moment [of the British army’s arrival] to drift away, and
the old pictures shyly courtseyed [sic] again for modern eyes.”88 In this way, Rostovtzeff and
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Johnson characterized the ruins as helpless and frozen in time, waiting for Europeans to return
and rescue them from the desert and its inhabitants. With this narrative, Rostovtzeff also tacitly
cast contemporary Syrian Arabs as the descendants of the Sassanian Persians, supposedly
ignorant of the importance of the site and not the region’s original inhabitants. At the same time,
he put forward Western political authorities and archaeologists as the descendants of Rome and
therefore the true heirs to the city — and, by extension, the region. Altogether, the speech
depicted Dura-Europos as a remnant of great civilization that would only resurface with the
“return” of Europeans to political power in the Eastern Mediterrean.
Through these arguments about Dura-Europos and its inhabitants, Rostovtzeff posed the
city as a case study of “one of the most important phenomena in the history of world civilization:
the hellenization of Oriental civilization, life and art first and then the re-orientalization of this
now mixed civilization and art.”89 In his telling, Syria was a battleground between Oriental and
Hellenistic, cycling between the two. Through this framing of antiquity, archaeology showed that
Western imperial powers had as much legitimacy as Arab nationalists calling for
self-governance.
In this narrative of “Orient” and “Rome,” Dura-Europos’ archaeologists painted Syrian
history as an ongoing struggle between the rational, civilized nature of the West and the
emotional, cruel ways of the East, which served as a tacit justification of French political power
over contemporary Syrians. Rostovtzeff delineated the official religion of the Roman garrison at
Dura as “conventional, traditional, political and official. No place for Oriental cults, no
emotional ceremonies.”90 Here he seemed again to draw a parallel between the Romans at Dura
and the French imperial government, while at the same time contrasting these two facets with
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their counterparts: the Parthians and their Arab “descendants.” His focus on emotion — or lack
thereof — plays into orientalist narratives that paint the Eastern or Arab “Other” as overly
passionate and effeminate, and by extension incapable of good government.91
Beyond subtle comparisons between the ancient Romans and the modern French and
British, Yale’s archaeologists also explicitly praised the mandatory powers. Hopkins lauded the
French and British for imposing a “regime of law and order” that put an end to guerrilla warfare
between Bedouin tribes, and then went on to tell the story of how British troops discovered the
ruins of Dura-Europos during a battle before being forced to retreat.92 Although he first wrote
that the site’s “paintings were left covered by hastily constructed walls,” he then crossed out the
typed word “covered” and replaced it with “protected” — a stronger endorsement of the British
action.93 He commended the French as well for beginning “systematic and very successful
excavations” once “peace was restored.”94 Rostovtzeff echoed such admiration for the French
authorities, applauding in a speech the “enlightened and kind attitude of the French civil and
military authorities in Syria and of M. Seyrig in particular.”95
Archaeological sites also aided the French in establishing a religious connection to the
region. The French had an easier time employing religious rhetoric in Lebanon with its sizable
Christian population, which France had first begun “protecting” in the seventeenth century.96
Although Syria had deep Christian roots, it proved more difficult to find contemporary Christian
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connections in majority-Muslim Syria.97 Therefore, archaeologists tended to divert much of their
limited time and resources to Christian and Jewish art and architecture when they were found.
Among both archaeologists and the general public, Dura-Europos became best known for
the discovery of a synagogue and an early Christian church in the ancient city — the discovery
of which Hopkins called “most astounding of all.”98 Both Rostovtzeff and Hopkins drew special
attention to the site’s connection to the history of Christianity. Hopkins celebrated the discovery
of a Christian chapel at Dura-Europos and described how “even now [he] cannot enter the room
without a thrill of surprise. The desert is so grey and colorless … As one steps into the room,
therefore, the brilliant hues, the immense variety of scene and color is startling by its very
contrast.”99 By comparing the “colorless” desert with the “brilliant” church interior, he seemed to
draw a larger conclusion about the benefits that the spread of Christianity could have for the
region.
Rostovtzeff, meanwhile, described the sites as “two places of worship which connect the
religious life of Dura with our own time,” explicitly tying the ancient Roman past to the
contemporary politics of the region.100 He further noted that the church paintings conveyed “the
most cherished ideas and mysteries of the new religion, which was destined to become the
religion of a large part of the civilized world today.”101 Whereas earlier he represented the battle
between West and East in the region as cyclical, here he characterized the eventual domination of
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Christianity as inevitable, resulting “in the victorious progress of the Christian faith” that
European imperial projects in the Muslim world could help promote.102
Yale went even further in tying together the ancient and contemporary Christians of the
region when they invited a Chaldean priest visiting from Iraq to conduct a service at the
Christian baptistry from Dura-Europos. The baptistry had been brought over from Syria as part
of the partage system and rebuilt at the Gallery of Fine Arts, now the Yale University Art
Gallery. A Yale press release noted that the priest was a “representative of the oldest oriental
Christian congregation” and “was deeply impressed by this oldest monument to the faith of his
forefathers,” holding the service “in the ancient Syrian tongue of his people.”103 With such
language, it noted the ongoing relevance of Syria’s ancient Christian history to some of its
religious sects, thereby positing the Yale archaeologists and the French government as saviors
coming to the aid of an oppressed minority.
These two central arguments of French archaeology stand in sharp contrast to each other.
On the one hand, this rhetoric argued that the Syrian past was once glorious and therefore needed
a helping hand from the French to achieve that glory again. This contrast between past and
present emerged during Rostovtzeff’s speech at Barnard, in which he noted that he found “the
spectacular ruins” of Mari “astonishing and surprizing [sic]” because he had to ask himself,
“How could such a palace of many hundreds of rooms with a majestic ziggurat (Babylonian
tower) have been built by a king who ruled over a stretch of land where a few settled Arabs
nowaday lead a miserable life?”104 By expressing such incredulity, he emphasized the difference
between the past achievements of the region — when it served as the “cradle of civilization” and
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the birthplace of Christianity and Judaisim — on the one hand, and its present lack of vitality on
the other.
But the second fundamental argument of French archaeology was quite the opposite. The
allochronic rhetoric that emerges from the archives of Dura-Europos argued not that ancient
civilization was advanced and necessary to recreate. Instead, the similarities that scholars like
Hopkins emphasized between past and contemporary Syrians were meant to prove that Syrians
were still too primitive and backward to rule themselves. Thus, Western archaeologists were
simultaneously arguing that Syrian antiquity was modern and savage, awesome and modest, in
need of recreation and in need of immediate abandonment.

“Syrians, Remember Your Forefathers”: Syrian Political Uses of Archaeology
As much as French authorities and Western archaeologists attempted to posit
archaeological sites and ancient history as their sole domain, events like foreign-led excavations
and the Great Syrian Revolt increasingly brought Syrians into contact with archaeology and
brought ancient history into the nationalist debate over Syria’s post-independence future.
Archaeologists initially alienated local populations with exploitative working conditions and
patronizing rhetoric, leading surrounding communities to destroy antiquities at several points.
Over time, however, local governments began to claim antiquities as Syrian patrimony, and
nationalists began to use ancient history to create and legitimize the Syrian nation.

Local Encounters with Antiquity
Not much research has been done into the attitudes and interactions of local populations
with ancient ruins before the mandate period, but the Syrians who had the greatest contact with
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archaeological sites under the French were the Syrians who lived near and worked on the digs.
For many of these laborers, these digs had negative consequences that served to alienate them
from archaeology and the ancient Syrian past.
Although Syrians did most of the physical work of archaeology, their Western overseers
made a clear distinction between “worker” and “archaeologist.”105 This distinction was based in
Napoleonic orientalism, which, in the words of Idir Ouahes, is predicated on “the assumption
that local peoples had neither an interest in their ancient past, nor the capacity to preserve it.”106
To illustrate this stereotype, Johnson recounted a story from Dura-Europos of a worker who was
“painstakingly breaking up big sherds into splinters.”107 When Johnson asked him why he was
doing so, the worker responded, “The Inspector said he wanted very small sherds,” referring to
the overseer’s instructions to collect even tiny pieces of ceramics from the rubble.108 Although
Johnson presented the story as supposed evidence of the ignorance of the local population, it
instead serves to demonstrate how little education Western archaeologists provided to their
workforce and how jealously they guarded historical knowledge production.
Unlike neighboring Iraq, where institutions like the National Museum of Iraq and the
Institute of Fine Arts and exchanges with the Oriental Institute of the University of Chicago
cultivated a generation of Arab archaeologists, the French in Syria made no such effort to include
Syrians in the intellectual and academic work of pre-Islamic archaeology.109 Even though the
Institut Français founded in Damascus in 1922 recruited “students to study the beautiful
specimens of their predecessor’s artistic production,” the institute focused solely on
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post-Hellenistic art and did not give Syrian students the opportunity to explore earlier periods in
the mandate’s history.110
On the rare occasions when Arab archaeologists held higher leadership positions, such as
the position of overseer, they sometimes did not come from Syria itself, like the Egyptian
foremen who oversaw excavations at Ingolt’s excavation at Hama and the Lebanese cousins,
Tannus and Elias Maluf, who aided Oppenheim in his dig at Tell Halaf.111 This pattern differed
from Iraqi policy, where foreign archaeological teams had to hire an Arab as a member of the
professional staff, who was paid on the pay scale of the other members and received a year of
education in England or America for every year of the dig.112 Max Mallowan claimed these
regulations made working in Iraq “impossible” compared to the more lax attitude of the French
mandate in Syria.113
In some cases, however, Western archaeologists developed close bonds with the Syrian
overseers or foremen at their digs. These men often came from influential Syrian families.
Ingholt’s dig at Hama, for example, was overseen by Ala ad-Din Afandi, a member of the
powerful al-Kilani family from Hama, and at Chagar Bazar, Mallowan employed two foremen
from Jerablus near Aleppo, named Abd es Salaam and Ahmad ibn Hamoudi.114 The latter was the
son of Hamoudi ibn Ibrahim, Leonard Woolley’s foreman at several of his excavations, thereby
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creating a Syrian archaeological dynasty.115 Agatha Christie described how “Hamoudi and Max
[Mallowan] are very gay together. They laugh and sing and cap stories.”116

Figure 8: Foreman Sheikh Hamoudi Ibn Ibrahim and Leonard Woolley. Max Mallowan claimed
that there was a “life-long friendship” between the two men. Hamoudi came from a respected
family of Syrian archaeologists, and his son was a foreman at Mallowan’s dig at Chagar Bazar.
Penn Museum, accessed April 10, 2021,
https://www.penn.museum/sites/expedition/sir-leonard-woolley/.
Figure 9: Full work team from Harald Ingholt’s dig at Hama, with Ala ad-Din Afandi from the
al-Kilani family and Egyptian overseers in the foreground. National Museum of Denmark,
accessed April 10, 2021,
https://en.natmus.dk/historical-knowledge/historical-knowledge-the-world/the-lands-of-the-medi
terranean/the-far-east/digital-hama-a-window-on-syrias-past/the-danish-expedition/.

While they developed friendships with certain employees, these archaeologists still held
racist and patronizing attitudes toward the majority of the workers they oversaw. For example,
Christie quoted her husband as telling the local sheikh at Chagar Bazar, ““How happy I shall be
… if it falls to my lot to enrich you by digging here,” and Oppenheim at Tell Halaf declared, “So
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far as I possibly could, I helped the workmen and their families, and they looked on me as a
father ... They were like children and were treated as such.”117 Such European accounts of worker
attitudes, however, must be taken with a hefty grain of salt, as their descriptions of the gratitude
and happiness of the workers contradict their simultaneous complaints about the difficulties of
finding and retaining laborers.
This divide in the Western imagination between the sophisticated, educated Western
“archaeologist” and the naive, childlike Syrian “worker” is most quantifiably visible in the
diverging wage rates of Western archaeologists and the manual laborers they hired on the
ground.118 Rostovtzeff reported to President Angell that Pillet had hired workers “for the
reasonable pay of about 1 franc a day,” which is equal to around fifty cents in 2015 USD.119 By
contrast, Clark Hopkins earned $3,500 a year beginning in 1929 and Rostovtzeff earned $10,000
beginning in 1930, meaning that these two archaeologists earned almost 250 times and over 700
times the daily rate of a Syrian worker, respectively.120 In the proposed budget for the 1933–1934
season, Hopkins and Rostovtzeff submitted a budget that proposed $4,000 for the director’s
salary alone, compared to just $1,000 for the total wages of thirty to forty workmen for the entire
season.121
Not only did archaeological labor pay low wages, but it may even have sometimes
constituted forced labor. Pillet complained to Angell in several reports about the difficulties of
117
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finding sufficient local workers but did not go into detail about the solution to the problem
beyond that the French military authorities were involved.122 The answer instead comes from
Christie, who heard during a visit to Dura-Europos that when Pillet was unable to entice laborers,
“In despair [the expedition] appealed to the French military authorities. The response was prompt
and efficient. The French arrested two hundred, or whatever the number needed was, and
delivered them at work.”123 Christie also reported that the French “used to keep their workmen
permanently half-pay in arrear,” which “ensured their working continuously.”124 Johnson even
boasted about the corporal punishment of Syrian laborers at Dura-Europos in an article for the
Princeton Alumni Weekly, remarking that “managing the workers is remarkably like taming lions
or running slum kids at a fresh air camp. The medium is the same, a four-foot switch.”125
Working on excavations could pose a lethal danger as well.126 In his 1932 progress report
for President Angell, Rostovtzeff referred to a tower collapse that resulted in the deaths of three
Syrian laborers, concluding from his inspection that to save “money and time Pillet penetrated
into the tower not by means of a broad and safe trench with gently sloping sides, but by means of
a deep and narrow gallery with almost vertical walls,” a method that “inevitably led to a
catastrophe.”127 Mallowan’s dig at Chagar Bazar similarly suffered a collapse that led to four
deaths, leading to the intervention of both the nearby French lieutenant and the local sheikh to
mediate between the British team and the aggrieved workers.128 Western archaeologists thus
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consistently valued efficiency and cost-effectiveness over Syrian lives and livelihoods, thereby
turning Syrians away from archaeology.
With such limited and deeply biased sources, it is difficult to ascertain the exact attitudes
of the Syrians who lived and worked on these sites.129 In the records of the Dura-Europos
excavations, workers were listed in field diaries as “men” and “boys,” without even their names
noted for posterity.130 At most, such diaries would make note of their pay or include “comments
about their deviousness.”131 Having been for the most part illiterate, these workers are left
without any voice relating how they viewed the sites they worked on. In the words of Gillot, “the
presence of the foreign archaeological missions seemed to have made the Syrian elites and local
workers progressively aware of the territory’s ancient history, but we cannot ignore the fact that
this awareness could have existed well before their interactions with archaeology. What remains
difficult to assess is whether archaeological remains were perceived by these groups of people as
their heritage.”132

Destruction as Resistance
Although some rural Syrians interacted with archaeology as workers in the early years of
the mandate, the debate over Syrian history came to a head during the Great Syrian Revolt in
1925. For the first time, the Syrian elite came together with tribal leaders to challenge the French
mandate on a large scale.
To bring together local populations across the country, insurgent leaders often used
rhetoric that centered the shared history of the Syrian population. For example, rebel leader
129
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Sultan al-Atrash issued a manifesto declaring, “Syrians, remember your forefathers, your history
… The imperialists have stolen what is yours.”133 With this manifesto, Atrash challenged several
of the tenets of French-led archaeology, including that both Syrian history and resources such as
archaeological artifacts belonged to European powers instead of to Syrians themselves.
At the same time, however, such insurgent rhetoric relied heavily upon another core
identity for many rural Syrians: Islam. Throughout the revolt, national leaders used Islamic
invocation and symbolism to mobilize the popular classes “in the name of the nation, but also in
the name of Allah, the Prophet, and religious solidarity,” with mosques turning into centers of
resistance and Muslim clerics serving as intermediaries between political thinkers and the
masses.134 As opposed to the more secular musings of Syrian intellectuals, military leaders
during the revolt mixed popular Islamic religion and anti-Christian agitation into their
proclamations, and so they “were able to communicate with and organize the resistance of
ordinary urban and rural Syrians far better than the self-appointed nationalist elite of intellectuals
and Western-educated politicians.”135
With this emphasis on shared religion, the Great Syrian Revolt mobilized Syrians based
more on the more visceral memory of the crusades and the Islamic wars of conquest than the
memory of its ancient civilizations.136 But beyond religion, what united Syrians across
geographic, ethnic, religious, and class lines during the revolt was less about what they had in
common and more about what they all opposed.137 The positing of the French as the “Other”
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helped form a national identity in opposition to everything related to the French, including some
of the sites that the French had worked so hard to claim as their own.
This popular indifference — and even antagonism — toward Western-led archaeology
came to a head in the battle for Damascus in October 1925. During the fight, the Kharrat and
Shallash bands occupied the ‘Azm Palace, the eighteenth-century home of Damascene governors
that the French had designated as the future home of the Institut d’Art et d’Archéologie
Musulman. The insurgents invaded the palace looking for the recently departed High
Commissioner, General Sarrail. When they did not find him, they destroyed or looted many of
the archaeological artifacts that the building housed.138 Instead of claiming these artifacts as their
own, the insurgents identified them as trappings of the French occupiers.139

Figure 10: Al-’Azm Palace during the Great Syrian Revolt. Although rebel bands took
the palace and destroyed many of the artifacts inside, it was the French military who bombed
much of the city, resulting in the further loss of historical and architectural treasures. Middle East
Institute, accessed April 10, 2021,
http://mideasti.blogspot.com/2013/08/colonial-echoes-1925-1926-france-bombs.html.
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The destruction of antiquities as a potential act of resistance occurred on several other
occasions.140 After Breasted and the British troops accompanying him left Dura-Europos in 1920,
Johnson recounted that “Bedouins rushed in and hacked and smashed the
pictures—idolatrous!”141 Although Johnson attributed the destruction to the prohibition of
figurative images in many parts of the Muslim world, it is likely not a coincidence that the
paintings were targeted soon after their association with the British military. Archaeologists
themselves were also sometimes targeted in Bedouin attacks, including a raid on the foreman’s
house at Dura-Europos and the shooting of an old French archaeologist traveling alone at night.
Hopkins stated, “Whether robbery or fancied grudge was the motive we never knew,” thus
acknowledging that resentment against Western archaeologists might have played a role in the
violence.142

Reclaiming Ancient History
Although Western archaeologists focused almost solely on the supposed indifference or
antipathy of local populations toward antiquity, a growing nationalist tide during the mandate
period worked to reclaim Syrian antiquity as a national treasure. This movement began with the
protests of local government officials against the export of antiquities found on Syrian soil. In
1921, Damascus State education minister Muhammad Kurd ‘Ali — backed by the Druze State
government — demanded that all Hittite artifacts found in the state of Damascus should remain
there.143 A few years later, Syrian Federation president Subhi Barakat al-Khalidi tried to block an
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excavation by a Czech team.144 In the first few years of the mandate, these efforts at asserting
local control over archaeology floundered. The French allowed the Czech mission to continue by
citing an obscure clause of the mandate charter, and Académie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres
blocked the request of the Iraqi-born antiquities dealer J. Elias Gejou to conduct an excavation of
Elamite artifacts in 1922.145
But in the later years of the mandate, local governments became more adept at countering
the efforts of French political and archaeological institutions. In exchange for the significant
numbers of artifacts exported to foreign museums, Western archaeologists began to agree to
perform services for local museums.146 Oppenheim provided plaster casts of sculptures he had
shipped to Germany to the National Museum in Aleppo, and Ingholt served as curator of the
American University in Beriut’s Archaeological Museum for the duration of his excavation at
Hama.147
At Dura-Europos, the climax of this gradual shift in power from French to Syrian
authorities came in 1935, after initial negotiations between Yale and Seyrig led Rostovtzeff to
believe that Yale would receive the synagogue and Syria would receive the Mithraeum.148 In an
unexpected turn of events, the Syrian senate reversed the decision and claimed the synagogue
instead.149 The Yale team was left with the Mithraeum, which led Rostovtzeff to write yet another
irritated letter to Angell, lamenting that all his efforts “were futile” and that “political interests
and intrigues are stronger than considerations of fairness, justice and scholarship.”150 Hopkins
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reported that Seyrig was likewise “chagrined and concerned” that the local government had
begun to question the decisions of the French-led antiquities service.151

Figure 11: The synagogue of Dura-Europos as displayed at the National Museum of Damascus.
The synagogue and its wall paintings remain one of the centerpiece’s of the museum’s collection.
Late Antique Syria, accessed April 10, 2021,
https://lateantiquesyria.files.wordpress.com/2016/03/dura-west-wall-and-torah-niche.jpg.

In addition to establishing a degree of autonomy and independence by retaining ancient
artifacts, Syrian nationalists during the latter half of the French mandate began to rely more
heavily on historical rhetoric to develop their visions of the Syrian nation. The main focus of
many Syrian nationalists during the years of the French mandate was to attain independence
while maintaining a status quo favoring the urban elite, and relying on ancient history proved a
useful tool to advancing this aim.152
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This emphasis on Syrian nationalism became the foundation of several political parties
and movements that emerged during the mandatory period.153 One of the first to assemble was
the People’s Party, led by Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar, which eventually morphed into the
National Bloc.154 In many ways, however, the Bloc only represented a small, elite segment of
Syrian society. Around ninety percent were Sunni Muslims, around eighty percent hailed from
Damascus or Aleppo, most had received an education abroad and were in middle age, and almost
all were the sons of landowners, wealthy merchants, or bureaucrats.155 These men and their
families had prospered economically and politically, first under the Ottomans and then under the
French, and were therefore loath to enact policies that would drastically alter the status quo.156
This concept of the “nation” that these nationalists were promoting was still nebulous at
the time and needed a foundation on which to rest. To uphold the status quo, this basis needed to
allow for European influence, while at the same time minimizing its importance. Many of these
early nationalists had attended secular schools and learned from the secular Young Turks
movement, and so they looked to a foundation that emphasized secularism rather than Islam.157
Moreover, the ideological underpinning of the movement needed to lend credence to Syria’s new
borders, both cutting out the rest of the Arab world and bringing together Syrians across ethnic
and religious lines. Syria’s ancient history — before the rise of Islam and featuring civilizations
with both European and local roots — checked these boxes.
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The main champion of this historical basis for Syrian nationalism was the young thinker
Antun Sa’adeh.158 Sa’adeh founded the Syrian Social Nationalist Party in 1932, and the French
imprisoned him soon afterward.159 He used ancient history as a model for relations between
Syrians and Europeans and as a basis for national pride, although his particular view of history
did not extend to politicizing archaeology. As an ardent believer in cosmopolitanism and
international exchange, Sa’adeh’s work examined both the good and the bad of exchange
between Europe and the Levant in classical times. His telling of history “registered fully the
violent expansion and ruthless imperial exploitation by Rome that prefigured modern
imperialism,” but it also recognized the material benefits of exchanges between Syrians, the
Greeks, and the Romans.160
In his opinion, this cosmopolitan exchange resulted in a civilization more vibrant and
accomplished than any people could achieve on their own. For example, he described how after
the fall of the Carthage, the Mediterranean witnessed a struggle between the “Syrian Empire and
the Roman Empire,” and although “the Syrian Empire proved to be the strongest power in the
Near East, its monarchical regime did nothing new towards the improvement of the art of
governing,” meaning that “the task of raising the standard of statecraft fell upon the shoulders of
158
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Rome, which was competent to do it.”161 Although a fervent Syrian nationalist, here Sa’adeh here
almost echoed the imperial rhetoric of the French, who contended that their form of civilization
was better suited to bring progress to Syria.
Using such examples, Sa’adeh positioned ancient history as “one key to define a nation
and to understand and restructure its twentieth-century relations with Westerners.”162 Like many
other moderate Syrian nationalists, he did not want to expel French influence from Syria in its
entirety, and he rejected the contemporary discourse — both from Syrians and from Westerners
like Rostovtzeff — that treated ancient Syrian history as an unending battle between East and
West.163 Instead, he viewed ancient history as a model of successful cosmopolitanism and
exchange that nationalists should emulate in post-independence Syria.
At the same time as he preached the benefits of cosmopolitanism, Sa’adeh also celebrated
Syrian achievements. In particular, he emphasized the progress and expansion of the Phoenician
empire, which stretched across swaths of modern-day Lebanon, Syria, Israel, and Palestine.
Phoenician civilization excited Sa’adeh not just because of its ethnic Syrian identity, but also
because they managed to leave a distinct mark around the Mediterranean, from Tyre to Carthage
to the Iberian peninsula.164
In developing his argument for the contributions of Syrian peoples to civilizational
progress, Sa’adeh cited several historical figures and events. In particular, Sa’adeh admired the
commercial spirit and success of the Phoenicians who, in his view, pioneered the system of the
city-state and thereby provided an early model of the nation in which Phoenicians “refrained
from fighting among themselves and maintained their states as one people linked together in
161
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life.165 He also celebrated Caracalla — a Roman emperor from the third century CE whose
mother stemmed from an Arab priestly family from Emesa in Syria — who extended Roman
citizenship to all free men of the empire through the Edict of Caracalla.166 Through such
examples, Sa’adeh mused that the Phoenicians “had distinctive cultural qualities and became a
model copied by those nations which came within the sphere of Syrian civilization, such as the
Greeks and the Romans.”167 By looking back to this “Syrian civilization” and its influence on
other societies, modern Syrians could both learn how to create a successful nation and feel pride
in their shared past.
While he admired the Romans for their progress in civil rights and jurisprudence, Sa’adeh
also expressed clear distaste for some of their methods and institutions. He enumerated several
destructive Greek and Roman wars, lamenting that “the destruction by the Roman and Greek
barbarians of the Phoenician capitals regrettably must have been devastating and complete.”168
He further derided the Roman institution of slavery, which included many Syrian slaves. As a
result, he lauded several of the slave revolts that exploded over the course of Roman history,
especially that of the Syrian slave Eunus.169 Like the French themselves, Sa’adeh saw a parallel
between the French imperialists and the Roman empire before them, both in positive reforms
they achieved and the brutality they enacted. Although he opposed violent overthrow of the
mandatory government, his admiration for Syrian slave revolts against the Romans had clear
contemporary significance.170
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In these parallels that he drew between ancient Syrians and Romans and their
contemporary equivalents, Sa’adeh in some ways conceived of history in the same way as the
French government and Western archaeologists. In other ways, however, his view of history
diverged radically. Although he was proud of ancient Syrian achievements, Sa’adeh did not trace
modern Syrians back to a single shared ancestor. He asked, “the Syrian nation, what single origin
does it go back to? To the Canaanites (Phoenicians), who came as a stratum over the stratum of
the Stone Age people or to the Amorites, or Hittites, or Aramaeans (Chaldeans)? Is not Syria a
specific mixture or compound of these peoples, plus the Arabs after Islam and others?” 171
Sa’adeh was therefore more interested in the contributions of different groups of people
to cosmopolitan civilization as a whole, rather than in the greatness or uniqueness of any
particular city or empire. As a result, his use of ancient history did not claim ownership over
specific sites in the same way that the French did. It was the broader arcs of history — be it
related to commerce, jurisprudence, or civil rights — that interested him, and by extension the
SSNP, more than the buildings and artifacts that sites like Palmyra and Dura-Europos had to
offer.
In addition to providing evidence for past Syrian achievements and rebellion against
European imperial powers, ancient history gave some Syrian nationalists tools for advocating for
one of their other goals: the “Greater Syria” ambition. According to Sa’adeh and the SSNP,
Greater Syria, known in Arabic as Bilad al-Sham, encompassed the entire Fertile Crescent from
the Taurus Mountains in modern-day Turkey to the Sinai and the Red Sea, including Syria,
Lebanon, Iraq, Transjordan, and Palestine.172 For many Syrians, this focus on Bilad al-Sham was
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a rejection of Western-imposed borders, which in their opinion arbitrarily grouped together
diverse regions and minority communities into the French mandate of Syria.173
The National Bloc wholeheartedly embraced the quest for Greater Syria. In 1928, the
group’s draft constitution proclaimed that “the Syrian territory separated from the Ottoman state
constitutes a single indivisible unit and any arbitrary division that has occurred from the end of
World War I [sic] is meaningless.”174 At their 1932 Congress in Homs, the Bloc established the
formation of Greater Syria as their primary aim, although it conceded that Lebanon could decide
its own borders.175
Even though the National Bloc mainly represented the interests of the urban elite, the
rhetoric of the Great Syrian Revolt indicated that the broader Syrian population also stood behind
the unity of Greater Syria. Rebel leaders often denounced the partition of the Ottoman province
of Syria and called for its reunification as one of their primary goals.176 Insurgent documents
from the time of the rebellion extolled “a common rural Arab culture, centering on ideals of
bravery, honor, and common historical memory.”177
As much as the Greater Syria ambition was a rejection of French-imposed borders, it was
also a repudiation of pan-Arabism. Syrian nationalists over the course of the mandate engaged in
an internal struggle over whether to center a pan-Syrian or a pan-Arab identity. As Zisser put it,
“pan-Syrianism implied a total commitment to Syrian identity ... while ignoring, negating or
repressing the Arab and Islamic elements in this identity.” 178 By embracing ancient history,
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pan-Syrian nationalists could sidestep the communal Arab and Islamic history of the region and
dismiss it as less important than the pan-Syrian networks and civilizations of the pre-Islamic era.
While pan-Syrianism emphasized a shared Syrian identity based in the ancient past, the
importance of Greater Syria on the nationalist agenda of groups like the National Bloc and the
SSNP minimized their emphasis on archaeological sites in Syria proper. Within the pan-Syrian
framework, Syrians could lay claim to civilizations from the Assyrians in the east to Phoenicians
in the west. With these better-known and more influential civilizations available, there was less
of a need to amplify and celebrate the accomplishments of more local populations, like those of
Mari and Palmyra. As a result, even those Syrian nationalists who relied on the use of ancient
history did not incorporate the importance of archaeology into their nationalist rhetoric.

Pushback from Arab Nationalism
Arab nationalists, meanwhile, rejected the use of ancient history in forging a shared
identity altogether. Instead, they focused on the history that tied together the entire Arab world
from the age of Muhammad onward. Whereas pan-Syrian nationalists looked back to the
achievements of ancient civilizations like the Phoenicians and the Romans, Arab nationalists
wanted to model their post-colonial world on the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates from the
early days of Islam.179 Focusing on the shared language and religion of the Arab world,
prominent Arab nationalist and Ba’ath party founder Michel Aflaq declared, “Let the Arabs of
today be Muhammad.”180
Influenced by movements in nearby countries like Iraq and Egypt, pan-Arab nationalism
gradually began to overtake pan-Syrian nationalism in centers like Damascus, Aleppo, and

179
180

Jones, “Understanding ISIS’s Destruction of Antiquities as a Rejection of Nationalism,” 32-33.
Ibid.

Bussemaker 51

Homs. This change coincided with the rise of the Syrian middle class, which began to challenge
the traditional elite. Whereas the slightly older group of Syrian nationalists had often attended
professional schools abroad and been exposed to European ideals, the formation of this new
generation began primarily at home.181 At schools called the tajhiz, “The history of the Arabs and
their great contribution to the progress of world civilization were taught in the most exacting
national terms. No glories or wonders of the Arab heritage were left unmentioned in the
classroom.”182
Younger and more radical than the old guard, this new wave of nationalists wanted
greater social and economic justice and pan-Arab unity, with a smaller emphasis on the
constitutionalism and individual liberties that the National Bloc championed.183 Whereas the
legal achievements of the Assyrians under Hammurabi and Romans under the ethnically Syrian
Caracalla provided the basis for the central tenets of the National Bloc, they were less relevant to
the new goals of this new generation, who instead focused on the Arab achievements their
education had emphasized. This more radical spirit resulted in the creation in 1933 of the League
of National Action, which condemned the National Bloc for its accommodationist policies
toward the French and called for action against the mandatory power “until full independence
had been achieved and the ‘greater Arab state’ had been formed.”184
But Arab nationalism was not always synonymous with a rejection of ancient history and
archaeology. In neighboring Iraq, for example, Arab nationalist leaders combined an emphasis
on a pan-Arab past with claims of ownership over pre-Islamic civilizations and the sites that they
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left behind. The leader on this front was Sati al-Husri, a pan-Arab nationalist of Syrian descent
who served as Director-General of Education under King Faisal in Iraq.185
Both Faisal and the British officials who led Iraq in the 1920s and 1930s struggled to find
a common identity for Iraqis. As late as 1933, Faisal lamented that in “Iraq there is still no Iraqi
people … but unimaginable masses of human beings, devoid of any patriotic ideal, imbued with
religious traditions and absurdities, connected by no common tie.”186 To define a new Iraq across
its many social, religious, and economic divides, Iraqi politicians turned to ancient history and
archaeology while continuing to embrace a pan-Arab agenda.187
For the most part, Husri highlighted the common language and shared history of the Arab
people.188 While other Arab nationalists traced this pan-Arab identity no further back than the
days of Muhammad and the ensuing Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates, Husri traced Arab history
into the pre-Islamic past. In doing so, he harnessed the German notion of the volk, which
“stressed an early ancestor nation disseminating the hallmarks of civilization to others.”189 For
Germans, this ancestor nation were the early German tribes, whereas Husri pinpointed the
Semitic peoples of the region, whom he called “pre-Islamic Arabs.”190
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As Director-General of Education, Husri considered his main duty ensuring that the next
generation of Iraqi leaders would have his same vision of Iraq’s past and its future path.191
According to Dawisha, “Husri sought to inculcate into the people, especially the young, a clear
and durable sense of Arab national identity that would supercede other prevalent identities, such
as tribalism, regionalism, and sectarianism.”192
In 1932, Husri brought the same pan-Arab fervor to his new post as Director of the
Department of Antiquities. He decried the massive export of antiquities that had occurred under
the Antiquities Law composed by British archaeologist Gertrude Bell during the years of the
British Mandate, and the department soon enacted a new Antiquities Law. 193 The revised law
imposed many more restrictions on foreign-led excavations and especially on the export of
artifacts, leading many Western archaeologists — like Mallowan, as mentioned earlier — to
move their work to Syria, where the French had much less stringent export ordinances.194 With
such restrictions on foreign expeditions, the Iraqi government began encouraging Iraqi-led digs.
Although most of these digs uncovered Islamic-era sites like Samarra and Wasit, the antiquities
department under Husri also excavated pre-Islamic sites like the Sumerian city Eridu and the
Hassuna site, Tell Hassuna.195
This emphasis on Iraqi-led archaeology shows a clear contrast with the strategies of
Syrian nationalists like Sa’adeh. Husri found a way to marry his pan-Arab ideology and a
national interest in ancient history, which led the Iraqi government to center historical and
archaeological education and to fight back against extractive antiquities laws in a way that Syrian
nationalists did not attempt to the same extent.
191

William L. Cleveland, The Making of an Arab Nationalist (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2015), 147,
muse.jhu.edu/book/38455.
192
Dawisha, Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century, 50.
193
Abdi, “From Pan-Arabism to Saddam Hussein’s Cult of Personality,” 15.
194
Ibid.
195
Ibid, 16.

Bussemaker 54

This unified ideology and action contrasted with the ongoing debate and confusion in
Syrian society over their national relationship with antiquity. Was it something to be celebrated
and learned from, as Sa’adeh argued? Something to be passed over in favor of Islamic history, as
Arab nationalists contended? Did the workers who lived and worked at excavations feel
ownership over their digs, or did they see it as just another European folly? Without a coherent
vision across the country, nationalist and local efforts to reclaim archaeology as a practice made
less headway than in Iraq.

Conclusion
Funds and finds at Dura-Europos began to dry up after 1935, and the Yale team finally
packed their bags and headed home in 1937.196 As the boat pulled out of Beirut, they left behind
a country much changed from when they had first arrived almost a decade earlier. As Syria
emerged from centuries of Ottoman rule, the fierce battle between French authorities and Syrian
nationalists over the country’s future hinged on their differing perceptions of the Syrian past. On
the one hand, French efforts to claim the Syrian past manifested in physical form through
archaeology, which the French mandate used to better control desert space, to profit from the
colonial project, and to legitimize the French civilizing mission.
Within the ranks of local nationalist movements, opinions split over how to present and
claim the past. Syrian nationalists like Antun Sa’adeh used ancient history as a method to unite
the Greater Syrian nation and celebrate the country’s cosmopolitan future, while Arab
nationalists minimized the importance of the ancient past and instead prioritized the Islamic era.
Both sides of the nationalist movement tended to deemphasize the importance of archaeology,
although Syrian government officials began to claim control over the export of antiquities.
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Meanwhile, while the methods of French authorities and Western archaeologists alienated many
Syrians who came to identify ancient Syria as the realm of the West, the rhetoric of the Great
Syrian Revolt and local labor at excavation sites nevertheless served to engage rural
communities more with ancient history.
The French mandate gave way to the Republic of Syria in 1945, and the final French
troops departed in 1946.197 Independence for the most part brought an end to the Greater Syria
ambition as neighboring countries became their own republics, but it also gave Syrians control
over national archaeology for the first time. A new generation of Syrian archaeologists came to
control historical discourse in the country, and the Ba’athist regime that has controlled Syria
since the 1960s has centered Syria’s pre-Islamic history in its nation-building project.198
Nevertheless, the legacies of Western archaeology in Syria remained for decades, as many
excavations led and funded by Western institutions continued to perpetuate the divide between
Western “archaeologists” and local “workers” laboring under often-exploitative conditions.199
The appropriation of ancient sites by French imperialists, Western archaeologists, and the
Ba’athist regime ultimately contributed to their destruction. Between 2011 and 2015, the Islamic
State in Iraq and Syria looted or razed many archaeological treasures in Syria, including the
famous Temple of Bel in Palmyra and most of Dura-Europos.200 There were many reasons for
such cultural destruction, including the lucrative nature of selling antiquities and the pre-Islamic
history of the sites. But most importantly, this demolition was a reaction to the relation between
archaeology and the series of exploitative regimes that have controlled Syria since the First
World War. As De Cesari argues, “[a]rchaeological sites in the Levant are imbued with the
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presence of colonialism and its persisting legacy in the oppressive nationalisms that followed:
they are a sign of the ultimate failure of the emancipatory project of the post-colonial
nation-state.”201
In response to the destruction, the mandate-era debate over patrimony, sovereignty, and
ownership reemerged. Many Western newspapers published articles condemning the acts of
violence as a loss to global cultural heritage, while Syrian artists created art inspired by the
influence of Palmyra on Syrian society.202 Once the Assad regime retook Palmyra from ISIS, it
held a patriotic concert among the ruins marred by bullet holes, with military marches blaring
and attendees waving Syrian flags.203 More than a century later after British troops first laid eyes
on the art of Dura-Europos, the competing visions of Syrian antiquity first seeded in the
tumultuous years of the French mandate — from imperial tool to nationalist trophy — persist.
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Bibliographical Essay
During a study abroad program in Morocco after my first year of college, our group went
on an excursion to the well-preserved ancient Roman ruins of Volubilis near the city of Meknès. I
had studied Latin all throughout high school and had loved reading about Greek and Roman
history ever since I was little, and so I was excited at the prospect of visiting such a site. But
even though it was a beautiful, sunny Saturday in June, we were practically the only ones there.
Used to the crowds that fill Roman ruins in Europe to the brim, I was a bit taken aback by the
emptiness. Even accounting for lower levels of domestic tourism in Morocco compared to
European countries, the lack of local visitors was striking.
In a class on the Roman Empire that I took the next spring, I therefore decided to write a
final paper on Roman sites like Volubilis in Morocco and what they mean to Moroccans today. I
found that French protectorate had harnessed the region’s ancient Roman history for its
imperialist rhetoric, using Roman ruins to link their history to Morocco’s and thereby defend
their civilizing mission. As a result, many Moroccans nowadays feel disconnected from the
country’s ancient history, linking it to Europe instead of to themselves.
This research sparked my interest in debates over cultural heritage and restoration,
leading me to write a paper for another class on the politics of restoration for ancient Iraqi sites
that ISIS destroyed a few years ago. Instead of focusing on European rhetoric, this paper
explored how Arab nationalists like Saddam Hussein employed ancient imagery to bolster their
political claims, using longgone empires to bring together Iraqis across religious and ethnic lines.
In my senior essay, I hoped to bring these two sides — European imperialist and Arab nationalist
— into conversation with each other as they debated their ownership of archaeological sites.
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To begin with, I chose to focus on both ancient Mesopotamian history in mandate-era
Iraq and ancient Roman history in mandate-era Syria so that I could contrast how differing
colonial regimes and civilizations affected how political actors harness history. Soon, however, I
realized that this left me with significantly too much ground to cover. Instead of exploring the
political use of ancient history in general, I decided to home in on the politicization of
archaeological sites in particular. Moreover, although there is a much more expansive secondary
literature on the mandate period in Iraq, I chose to zoom in on just Syria, focusing above all on
the Yale dig at Dura-Europos.
Unfortunately, the COVID pandemic got in the way of my vague plans to visit several
archives in Jordan that house periodicals, textbooks, and other primary sources from Levantine
countries in the 1920s and 1930s. But luckily for this project, the Yale Manuscripts and Archives
and the Yale University Art Gallery hold the papers of several of the archaeologists involved at
Dura-Europos. Above all, I made use of the Michael Ivanovitch Rostovtzeff papers and the Clark
Hopkins papers, as well as those of Yale University President James Angell, Classics department
chair George Lincoln Hendrickson, and the Yale University Art Gallery. The main limitation of
these sources is that their authors are American academics rather than French politicians or
administrators, but the Hendrickson papers provided correspondence showing the tight French
control over the American-led digs, which sparked both admiration and frustration from the Yale
professors.
Although these papers were more scant on the details of day-to-day excavation than I had
anticipated, they were much more explicit in their justification of the French presence than
expected. The sources’ passing mentions of local workers at the digs prompted me to look
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beyond the viewpoints of the urban elite in Damascus and try to tease out the experiences of
rural, nomadic, or lower-class Syrians in relation to archaeology at the time.
On the side of the Arab and Syrian nationalists, I have mainly relied on political treatises
from leading Syrian intellectuals at the time, including Sati al-Husri and, above all, Antun
Sa’adeh. These writings helped clarify the distinctions between Arab, Greater Syrian, and Syrian
forms of nationalism that divided the Damascene political circles during the mandate period.
Perhaps my greatest challenge in identifying primary sources — besides the difficulty of
deciphering Arabic, French, and questionable penmanship — was finding the voices of Syrians
who fell outside Syria’s bourgeois class. Rather than having distinct primary sources reflecting
these voices, these perspectives instead come in bits and pieces quoted in a variety of secondary
sources and from the accounts of Western archaeologists like Agatha Christie.
Beyond the available primary sources, several of the secondary sources I came across in
my research have profoundly shaped my thinking on the topic. Firstly, several works helped
place the three sets of Yale archaeological papers into context. For example, the paper
“Photographing Dura-Europos, 1928–1937: An Archaeology of the Archive” and the book
Dura-Europos — both by Jennifer Baird — provided key insights into how Western
archaeologists thought about contemporary Syrians through an allochronic lens. More
importantly, the article used photographs from the Dura-Europos expedition as its primary
analytical target, which prompted me to push myself to think outside of the realm of written
sources alone and take a closer look at some of the photographs found in the Yale collections.
Another valuable source was Daniel Neep’s Occupying Syria Under the French Mandate, which
details the often brutal military tactics that the French used and explains French concepts of
control, space, and nation-building. Both of these texts were vital in allowing me to make the
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jump from the facts presented in the primary sources to the more abstract concepts that they
represented.
On the topic of Syrian nationalism, the most authoritative among the secondary sources
was Philip Khoury. His definitive work on the history of Syrian nationalism helped bring nuance
to my thinking on the subject by outlining the ways in which Syrian elites wanted to both upend
and uphold the status quo with their brand of nationalist ideology. The volume Antun Sa’adeh:
The Man, His Thought: An Anthology, edited by Adel Beshara, also proved useful in putting
various aspects of Antun Sa’adeh’s historical thinking into context, with each chapter analyzing a
different facet of his worldview. In addition, Idir Ouahes’ volume, Syria and Lebanon Under the
French Mandate: Cultural Imperialism and the Workings of Empire, was key to understanding
how the local Syrian government began to resist the French antiquities service. Altogether, the
secondary literature has pinpointed several additional facets related to my question, leading me
to place greater emphasis on concepts like violence, space, resistance, and class in my writing.
Although these sources were all valuable in their own ways, the literature on the subject
as a whole has a few gaps, especially since Syria lies in an understudied part of the world.
Secondary sources in the field tend to focus on either the French or the Syrian side, with little
comparison and direct conversation between the two. Works also tend to use the mandate period
as an introduction to later Syrian history under the Ba’ath party and the Assad regime, and so the
details for the mandate period are often less precise and more perfunctory. Finally,
French-language scholarship — and especially Arabic-language work — was often harder to
both find and access.
At the beginning, undertaking such a project during a pandemic was daunting. I had for
years hoped to conduct international archival research as part of a senior essay on the Middle
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East, but I instead had to adapt both my topic and my methods to work closer to home.
Nevertheless, the primary and secondary sources cited have come together to form what I hope is
a nuanced and accurate portrait of politics and archaeology in mandate-era Syria.
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